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## Prospects for the development of the CSTO in new conditions

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## Introduction

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is a military and political union of Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and the only structure in the post-Soviet area that provides member states with guarantees of mutual military assistance and political support in case of external aggression.

At the same time, the task of developing the Organization as “a key instrument for maintaining stability and ensuring security in the CIS area”, set out in the 2008 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation<sup>1</sup>, was not implemented, but ceased to be declared as a foreign policy priority in the Concepts adopted in 2013, 2016 and 2023. The rejection at the end of 2021 of the draft new agreements proposed by Russia in pan-European security by the West, which provoked the start of the Special Military Operation in Ukraine, led to virtually direct confrontation between Russia and Western countries. Due to the growing geopolitical tensions, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh also developed.

All these events complicated the conditions for the CSTO development and jeopardized the effectiveness of decision-making in the Organization. The 2023 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation formulates “strengthening the potential and increasing the international role of the CSTO” as one of the priorities in general, emphasizing the “anti-crisis and peacekeeping” potential of the Organization, its role in ensuring biological security<sup>2</sup>. Currently Moscow’s task is to preserve and develop the CSTO, which remains a tool for Russia to maintain leadership in the emerging Eurasian subsystem of international relations. This report timely addresses the key aspects of the CSTO’s activities under the world order crisis of 2022-2023 in order to analyze the prospects for the development of the Organization. The first section examines the formation and evolution of the Organization, which shaped its historical and institutional memory. Adaptation of the Organization to the geopolitical crisis of 2022-2023 became the subject of analysis in the second section. An attempt to outline possible scenarios for further transformation of the CSTO is made in the third section. In conclusion, the authors’ assessment of the scenarios is provided.

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<sup>1</sup> The 2008 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (In Russ.). URL: <http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/785>

<sup>2</sup> The 2023 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (In Russ.) URL: <https://www.mid.ru/ru/detail-material-page/1860586/>

# 1. CSTO's role in ensuring security and stability in the post-Soviet area

## 1.1. History of the CST and CSTO

The Collective Security Treaty (CST), or "Tashkent Treaty," was signed in May 1992 by Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in Tashkent (Uzbekistan). In 1993 Azerbaijan, Belarus and Georgia joined it.

According to the Tashkent Treaty, the participants pledged "not... to enter military alliances or take part in any groups of the states, as well as in the actions against other Member State" (Article 1), to "consult with each other on all important issues of the international security affecting their interests, and coordinate positions on these issues", coordinate their positions "in case of menace to safety, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty of one or several Member States or menace to international peace and safety" (Article 2). Article 4 has become traditional for agreements of this kind, which states that aggression against one member state will be considered as aggression against all participants of the CST. They also promised in case of aggression against one participant, "immediately provide the latter with the necessary help, including military one, as well as provide support by the means at their disposal" (Appendix 1).

The treaty came into force in 1994, but in fact it did not ensure consistency in the signatories' positions on security issues. The effectiveness of the CST was limited by fundamental contradictions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the lack of mechanisms for prompt response to threats outside the member states, for example, to the situation in Afghanistan. In 1997, the countries participating in the CST, Azerbaijan and Georgia, and since 1999, Uzbekistan, joined the GUAM association (GUUAM), whose activities were aimed at gradual integration into Western security structures, incompatible with the obligations under the CST. As a result, after the expiration of the CST first five-year term in 1999, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan did not sign the protocol on its extension.

The next five-year period became the first test for the CST. In 1999–2000 In the Batken region of Kyrgyzstan, clashes took place between militants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the armed forces of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. These events showed high vulnerability of the national security of the Central Asian states, which had to be stopped by intensifying bilateral military cooperation between these countries and Russia<sup>1</sup>. As a result, in 2000, as part of the reform and revitalization of the CST, an Agreement on the basic principles of military and technical cooperation was signed<sup>2</sup>, which established preferential prices for the supply of Russian military

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<sup>1</sup> Troitskiy E.F., Zinoviev V.P. The Collective Security Treaty Organization: Emergence, Evolution and Crisis of the Military-Political Alliance // *Rusin*, 2018. № 54. P. 338.

<sup>2</sup> On the agreement on the basic principles of military-technical cooperation between the states parties to the Collective Security Treaty of May 15, 1992 (In Russ.) URL: [https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign\\_policy/integracionnye-strukturnye-prostranstva-sng/1682123/](https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/integracionnye-strukturnye-prostranstva-sng/1682123/)

equipment for the CST member states. In 2001, a decision was adopted to create a common military body - the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces of the Central Asian Region<sup>1</sup>.

After September 11, 2001, the Central Asian region became the focus of attention of both Russia and the United States due to its geographic proximity to Afghanistan and the location of American military bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. As a result, an international organization was created in order to develop a regional system of collective security in the CST area. The corresponding decision was adopted by the Collective Security Council on May 14, 2002. The Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) was signed in October 2002 and came into force in September 2003.

According to the Charter, the goals of the CSTO were “strengthening of peace, international and regional security and stability, protection of independence on a collective basis, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Member States” (Article 3). The main principles of the CSTO activities were “respect of independence, voluntariness of participation, equal rights and duties of the Member States, non-interference into the affairs falling within the national jurisdiction of the Member States” (Article 5). In addition, “Provisions of the Treaty and the international treaties and resolutions of the Council for Collective Security of the Treaty ... shall be binding for the Member States of the Organization ... and the Organization itself” (Article 2) (Appendix 2).

Although the document stated that the CSTO would cooperate with third states and “keep in touch with the international intergovernmental organizations operating in the sphere of security” (Article 4), it was assumed that the members states would decide on the deployment of troop contingents and military bases of third parties on their territories only after consultations (coordination) with other member states (Article 7). Moreover, in 2011, the Protocol on the deployment of military infrastructure facilities on the territories of the CSTO member states was signed, and in 2012, it came into force. According to it member states can make decisions on the deployment of military groups and military infrastructure facilities of third countries on their territory after urgent consultations (coordination) with other Parties and in the absence of their official objections<sup>2</sup>.

The CSTO Charter also covered such issues as the formation of a collective security system, the creation of regional groupings of troops, military infrastructure, training of personnel for the armed forces, and provision of member states with weapons and military equipment. The member states pledged to coordinate their actions in the fight against international terrorism, extremism and organized transnational crime, as well as in combating illicit trafficking of drugs, psychotropic substances and weapons (Articles 7-8). The Charter assumed coordination by member states of

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<sup>1</sup> Collective rapid deployment forces of the Central Asian collective security region // Joint Headquarters of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (In Russ.). URL: <https://jscsto.org/security/crdf-car/?ysclid=lmewwiqrgd429474376>

<sup>2</sup> Protocol on the deployment of military infrastructure facilities on the territories of member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (In Russ.) URL: [https://odkb-csto.org/documents/documents/protokol\\_o\\_razmeshchenii\\_obektov\\_voennoy\\_infrastruktury\\_na\\_territoriyakh\\_gosudarstv\\_chlenov\\_organiza/#loaded](https://odkb-csto.org/documents/documents/protokol_o_razmeshchenii_obektov_voennoy_infrastruktury_na_territoriyakh_gosudarstv_chlenov_organiza/#loaded)

their foreign policy positions on issues of international and regional security (Article 9) (Appendix 2). The Charter approved the organizational structure, which was subsequently supplemented, as well as the procedure for forming the general budget from the shared contributions of the member states.

## 1.2. CSTO structure

In accordance with the 2002 version of the CSTO Charter, the following bodies were established:

- The Collective Security Council;
- The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs;
- The Council of Ministers of Defense;
- The Committee of Secretaries of Security Councils;
- The Secretariat of the Organization.

Later their list was expanded. Each member state received one vote in the relevant CSTO bodies.

The supreme body of the CSTO is the **Collective Security Council (CSC)**. It considers fundamental issues of the CSTO's activities, ensures the implementation of the goals and objectives of the Organization, coordination and joint activities of its member states. The CSC includes the heads of the CSTO member states (Article 13). The majority of the Organization's member states are represented by presidents; only Armenia is represented by a prime minister, who is the de facto head of state in this country. Meetings of the CSC are held once a year, but the Council can meet for an extraordinary session at the initiative of one of the member states. The role of the Chairman of the CSC is performed by the head of the member state where the next session of the CSC is taking place, until the next regular meeting. A series of subsequent crises in the CSTO area showed that in acute situations it is the mechanism of extraordinary sessions of the CSC that is more often used than the permanent bodies of the CSTO, which reduces the effectiveness and trust in the rest of the apparatus and makes it difficult to maintain continuity of the agenda.

In the period between Council sessions, issues of CSTO cooperation are dealt with the **Permanent Council**, consisting of permanent and plenipotentiary representatives of the member states. Since 2004, in accordance with the decision of the CSC, it has been performing the function of a coordinating body. Its tasks include coordinating the positions of member states on the activities of the CSTO, assessing and analyzing the situation, exchanging information on security issues, implementing the decisions of the CSC and preparing drafts of such decisions. The main areas of his responsibility are foreign policy activities, military-political integration, development of proposals to combat international terrorism, extremism, transnational organized crime, illicit trafficking of drugs, psychotropic substances and weapons, as well as illegal migration and other security threats. Its meetings are held at least twice a month.

**The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (CMFA)** and **Council of Ministers of Defense (CMD)** received the status of advisory and executive bodies of the CSTO for coordinating the interaction of member states in relevant areas: the first one - in foreign policy (Article 14), the second one - in military policy, military development and military and technical cooperation (Article 14). The Councils meet at least twice a year. The **Committee of Secretaries of Security Councils (CSSC)** is called upon to perform a similar function in ensuring national security (Article 16).

Under the Councils of Ministers and the Committee of Secretaries of Security Councils, various **working groups, coordination councils and other subsidiary bodies** work. Thus, the Working Group on Afghanistan has been operating under the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs since 2006, and in 2016, under the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, a Working Group was created to coordinate the joint training of military personnel and scientific work. A number of such structures operate under the Committee of Secretaries of Security Councils, including the Coordination Council of Heads of Competent Authorities to Counter Illicit Drug Trafficking (since 2005), Coordination Council of Heads of Competent Authorities for Emergency Situations and Coordination Council of Heads of Competent Authorities for Countering Illegal Migration (since 2007), Working Group on Information Policy and Information Security, Coordination Meeting of Chief Narcologists, Coordination Council of Authorized Bodies on Biological Security Issues, Working Group on Combating Terrorism and Extremism.

By the decision of the CSC adopted on April 28, 2003, **CSTO Joint Headquarters** was established - a permanent body responsible for supporting the military activities of the Organization that is located in Moscow. It is staffed on a quota basis by military personnel of member states in proportion to contributions to the Organization's budget. It is headed by the Chief of the Joint Staff, appointed by the Collective Security Council.

The position of the **Secretary General**, reporting to the CSC and appointed by it for three years, until 2015, by informal agreement, was occupied by a representative of Russia, but later it was decided to introduce a rotational basis in alphabetical order. Today this principle is respected, although with difficulties sometimes: after the Armenian representative was recalled from his post in 2018, for the remaining period the position again passed to the Russian representative, with the end of whose term there was a return to alphabetical order. Since January 1, 2023, this position has been occupied by the representative of Kazakhstan I.N. Tasmagambetov.

Subordinate to the Secretary General is the **Secretariat** - a permanent body providing information, analytical, organizational and advisory support for the CSTO activities. In agreement with member states, the Secretariat is preparing a draft budget for the Organization for the next year. The Secretariat is formed from citizens of the CSTO member states on a quota basis in proportion to contributions to the Organization's budget. It is located in Moscow.

To solve issues of the supply of weapons and military equipment, which began to be carried out since 2000 to the CSTO member countries at domestic prices, the CSC created the **Interstate**

**Commission for Military-Economic Cooperation** by the decision adopted on June 23, 2005. The commission develops recommendations on long-term programs of military and economic cooperation, in the production and standardization of military products, and rapprochement of the legal framework on military and economic cooperation. It may submit proposals on issues related to military and economic cooperation for consideration by the CSC. Its meetings are held at least twice a year, and its annual report is submitted to the CSTO Secretary General. The preparation of decisions and recommendations of the Interstate Commission is carried out by the national parts of the Commission and/or the CSTO Secretariat. Recommendations and decisions prepared by the Interstate Commission are sent by the CSTO Secretariat to the governments of the member states or to the CSC. In 2008, a Business Council was established under the Commission, consisting of representatives of holdings, concerns, military industry enterprises and financial circles of the CSTO member states, designed to develop proposals for integration in the military-industrial sphere, the creation of joint ventures and favorable conditions for R&D in the production of military equipment, etc.

In 2006, within the framework of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly, the chairmen of the national parliaments of the CSTO member states adopted a resolution on the creation of the **Parliamentary Assembly (PA)** of the CSTO. In March 2007, the Temporary Regulations on the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly were approved, which gave it the status of an interparliamentary cooperation body formed from parliamentary delegations of members of the association<sup>1</sup>. The CSTO Parliamentary Assembly received the right not only to send proposals to the CSC on issues of cooperation in the international, military-political, legal and other fields, but also to adopt recommendations on the convergence of the legislation of member states in these areas and model legislative acts regulating the main areas of the CSTO's activities.

The Parliamentary Assembly is headed by a Chairman, elected for three years on a rotation basis and subject to consensus in making this decision. The Chairman of the Assembly since the end of 2016 is the Speaker of the State Duma of the Russian Federation V.V. Volodin, re-elected to this post in 2021. Within the Parliamentary Assembly, there are three permanent commissions, which are responsible for defense and security issues; political issues and international cooperation; socio-economic and legal issues respectively. The organization of the substantive activities of the Assembly is carried out by the Council of the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly, and for organizational and technical issues - the Secretariat of the Council of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly, within which the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly Secretariat operates.

The presence of the Parliamentary Assembly contributed to the harmonization of the legislation of the CSTO member states in countering terrorism and extremism, and the development of


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<sup>1</sup> Temporary Regulations on the Parliamentary Assembly of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. URL: <https://pacsto.org/documents/vremennoe-polozhenie-o-parlamentskoy-assamblee-organizatsii-dogovora-d266ba32-b0b9-4724-8556-e81b466637f5>

military and political cooperation. The CSTO Parliamentary Assembly, in addition to drawing up recommendations and model legal acts, of which in 2006-2022 more than 80 ones were adopted, can officially express its position on international security issues. For example, such a statement on the situation in Afghanistan was adopted in 2021. The CSTO Parliamentary Assembly is also conducting targeted information and analytical work. Members of the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly take part in monitoring referendums and elections in the CSTO member states. However, its activities did not expand the CSTO's ability to quickly respond to critical situations.

In an effort to increase the speed of the Organization's response to crises, operational bodies were created in the CSTO. In 2012, the **Military Committee** was created for prompt response to situations requiring the use of collective forces of the CSTO. The **CSTO Crisis Response Center** started operating in 2018. However, the use of CSTO forces, as subsequent events proved, requires the consent, first of all, of the heads of the member states, that is why the created rapid response structures rather perform technical functions.

CSTO structure<sup>1</sup>



### 1.3. CSTO instruments and areas of activity

According to the Protocol on Amendments to the CSTO Charter adopted in December 2010, the CSTO member states not only cooperate in ensuring collective security, but also interact in military and technical (military and economic) areas, support the armed forces, law enforcement agencies and special services with the necessary weapons, military, special equipment and special means,

<sup>1</sup> CSTO Structure. URL: <https://en.odkb-csto.org/structure/>



provide training of military personnel and specialists for the national armed forces, special services and law enforcement agencies.

In 2016, at the session of the Collective Security Council in Yerevan, the Collective Security Strategy of the CSTO for the period up to 2025 was approved. It lists external and internal challenges and threats to the collective security of the CSTO, and also provides for joint actions of member states in various issues, including the political sphere, military security, areas of countering transnational threats, crisis response, peacekeeping, countering drug trafficking, illegal migration of third country nationals and others<sup>1</sup>.

In foreign policy coordination information exchange, joint statements and coordination of actions in international organizations are expected. In 2004, the UN General Assembly granted observer status to the CSTO. In addition, the CSTO received the opportunity to interact with the OSCE, CIS, and SCO. According to the Third Protocol on Amendments to the CSTO Charter adopted in 2018, third states and international organizations can receive Observer or Partner status with the CSTO. Foreign policy coordination within the CSTO covered a wide range of international problems, but not issues key to Russian interests: the CSTO countries took a restrained position regarding its conflict with Georgia in 2008, the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the situation around Crimea in 2014.

Since 2003 coordination of countering the spread of drugs has been taking place at the CSTO basis in the format of regional operations and activities. Currently, such coordination is carried out in accordance with the Anti-Drug Strategy of the CSTO for 2021-2025. Since 2008, Operation ‘The Illegal’ has been carried out to combat violations of the migration legislation of the CSTO member states.

In addition to the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces of the Central Asian region numbering about 5 thousand people, there are also Collective Rapid Reaction Forces of the CSTO aimed at solving military tasks. They were created in 2009 and number about 20 thousand people from the CSTO member states’ troops. Their training is also carried out during regular joint exercises. In accordance with the Agreement on Peacekeeping Activities of the CSTO of 2007, Peacekeeping Forces were created, which can be used both on the territory of the CSTO member states and beyond their borders under the mandate of the UN Security Council. The Peacekeeping Forces include about 3.5 thousand military personnel and employees of internal affairs bodies of the CSTO member states<sup>2</sup>. In 2014 Collective Aviation Forces were created, which, in addition to transporting

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<sup>1</sup> On October 14, 2016, the CSTO Collective Security Council in Yerevan adopted a decision on approval of the Collective Security Strategy until 2025, as well as on additional measures to combat terrorism and create a Crisis Response Center. URL: <https://en.odkb-csto.org/session/2016/session2016/#loaded>

<sup>2</sup> History of creation, fundamentals of activity, organizational structure. URL: <https://en.odkb-csto.org/25years/>

personnel and cargo, can participate in search and rescue activities and the evacuation of the sick and wounded.

In accordance with the Agreement on the Basic Principles of Military-Technical Cooperation adopted in 2000, the CSTO regularly supplies military equipment and weapons at preferential prices. Thus, in 2021, due to the aggravation of the situation in Afghanistan, the CSTO promised to provide the necessary military and military-technical assistance to Tajikistan. Based on the inter-state agreement Russia transferred 12 modernized armored reconnaissance and patrol vehicles to the armed forces of Tajikistan, a batch of small arms, as well as close combat equipment and radiation, chemical and biological protection<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> The CSTO will help Tajikistan in the event of an aggravation of the situation on the border with Afghanistan - Secretary General (In Russ.) URL: <https://www.militarynews.ru/story.asp?rid=1&nid=557281&lang=RU>

## 2. CSTO in action: challenges and achievements, country cases

### 2.1. Uzbekistan and the CSTO

Considering the voluntary nature of the CSTO participation, as stated in the Charter of the Organization, any member state can withdraw from it by sending an official notification to the Secretary General and cease to be its member after six months. Due to the absence of significant reputational and material losses due to leaving the Organization, Uzbekistan managed to manipulate its membership in it for a long time. The country signed the Tashkent Treaty on May 15, 1992, but not the Protocol on its extension in 1999, which was the result of differences in its foreign policy priorities with other CST member states.

In 2005, in Andijan, the authorities suppressed riots with the use of weapons, and thus were criticized by the West, but not by Moscow. In exchange for support, Uzbekistan agreed to sign the CSTO Charter in August 2006 and restore membership through a simplified procedure. Subsequently, Uzbekistan repeatedly postponed the signing and ratification of other documents of the Organization under various pretexts. For example, the country refrained from participating in the formation of the Collective Rapid Reaction Forces in 2009. Thus, Uzbekistan made its participation in the CSTO as formal as possible.

In 2012, Uzbekistan officially terminated its membership in the CSTO, sending a corresponding note to the Secretariat of the Organization. The formal pretext was Uzbekistan's disagreement with the CSTO's ideas for expanding military cooperation and the Organization's plans for Afghanistan<sup>1</sup>. In fact, as Uzbekistan's relations with the West normalized, the value of support from the CSTO and Russia in particular for it decreased.

Since new President Shavkat Mirziyoyev came to power in 2016, Tashkent has normalized relations with neighboring states and stepped up military cooperation with Moscow. The bilateral agreement between Russia and Uzbekistan adopted in November 2005 remained in force. As a result, Uzbekistan became the only country outside the CSTO that, like its partners in the Organization, receives weapons from Russia at domestic Russian prices<sup>2</sup>. In addition, Tashkent resumed participation in joint military exercises with the CSTO member states. For example, in summer 2023, the country organized such exercises with Kyrgyzstan<sup>3</sup> and Kazakhstan<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Golub K., Golub Y. Collective Security Treaty Organization: Origins of the Multidimensional Mandate and Modern Means for Its Implementation // International Organisations Research Journal, 2018, vol. 13, no 1, pp. 198.

<sup>2</sup> Khrolenko A. Why Russia and Uzbekistan are intensifying military cooperation (In Russ.) URL: <https://uz.sputniknews.ru/20210331/pochemu-rossiya-i-uzbekistan-aktiviziruyut-voennoe-sotrudnichestvo-18048357.html>

<sup>3</sup> Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan conducted joint exercises for special forces (In Russ.) URL: <https://uz.sputniknews.ru/20230803/uzbekistan-kyrgyzstan-ucheniya-foto-37554727.html>

<sup>4</sup> Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan conducted joint cyber exercises (In Russ.) URL: <https://uz.sputniknews.ru/20230808/uzbekistan-kazakhstan-sovmestnye-ucheniya-37678327.html>

## 2.2. Crisis in Kyrgyzstan 2010 and the CSTO

The first real test for the CSTO was the situation in Kyrgyzstan in 2010. The low standard of living, contradictions between the north and south of the country, widespread corruption and clanism, as well as the weakness of power structures over the past decades provoked political instability in Kyrgyzstan. The 2010 April crisis was provoked by the aggravation of the socio-economic situation in the country<sup>1</sup>. In February 2010, rallies began in the north of the country, and in early April the opposition seized power in the capital. In June the situation escalated in the southern regions, where the Uzbek community lives compactly.

The joint statement of the heads of the CSTO member states made on May 8, 2010 confirmed that the April events were considered an internal affair of the Kyrgyz Republic, while at the same time the need to provide humanitarian and other assistance to resolve the internal political situation was noted<sup>2</sup>. Attempts to normalize the situation were made at the level of individual states, but in different directions: for example, Kazakhstan assisted in the evacuation of the President of Kyrgyzstan Kurmanbek Bakiev<sup>3</sup>. In turn, Russia actually supported the opposition due to dissatisfaction with the foreign policy course of the government and characterized the events in the country as an “internal conflict”<sup>4</sup>.

As a result of the meeting of the secretaries of the Security Councils on June 14, 2010, measures to resolve the crisis were agreed upon, including material assistance to the current government. The joint statement emphasized that the efforts of law enforcement agencies of the Kyrgyz Republic, with active assistance from the CSTO member states, will provide conditions for stabilizing the situation<sup>5</sup>. At the end of June, a meeting was held in Bishkek between CSTO Secretary General Nikolai Bordyuzha and the head of the Provisional Government of Kyrgyzstan, Roza Otunbaeva, during which he confirmed the Organization’s readiness to provide the necessary assistance and provide special equipment and vehicles<sup>6</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Malyshev D.V. Revolutionary events of 2010 in Kyrgyzstan: Main Preconditions and the Reaction of World Society // Lomonosov World Politics Journal, 2011, № 1. P. 131-135 (In Russ.)

<sup>2</sup> Statement by the heads of state members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization - the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan, the Republic of Uzbekistan on the situation in the Kyrgyz Republic (Moscow, May 8, 2010) // Collection of joint statements of the CSTO member states. 2019. P.28 (In Russ.)

<sup>3</sup> Malyshev D.V. Revolutionary events of 2010 in Kyrgyzstan: Main Preconditions and the Reaction of World Society // Lomonosov World Politics Journal, 2011, № 1. P. 140 (In Russ.)

<sup>4</sup> Russia considered the unrest in Osh an internal conflict in Kyrgyzstan (In Russ.). URL: <https://lenta.ru/news/2010/06/12/refuse/>

<sup>5</sup> Statement by the secretaries of the security councils of the member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization - the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan (Moscow, June 14, 2010) // Collection of joint statements of the CSTO member states. 2019. P. 199 (In Russ.)

<sup>6</sup> Roza Otunbaeva received N. Bordyuzha (In Russ.) URL: <https://www.azattyk.org/a/2082443.html>

Since by the end of summer the situation in Kyrgyzstan normalized, the participation of the CSTO in resolving the situation was no longer required. Nevertheless, the crisis in the country demonstrated the reluctance of the CSTO member states' leadership to participate in solving complex ethnopolitical conflicts, thereby raising questions about the effectiveness of the Organization. The need to propose a model for responding to such events was considered as one of the grounds for reforming the CSTO, which became the central topic of the informal CSTO summit held in August 2010 in Yerevan.

### **2.3. CSTO reform 2010**

Events in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, where a violent change of government provoked inter-ethnic clashes, contributed to the revision of the CSTO Charter. According to the Protocol on Amendments to the CSTO Charter adopted on December 10, 2010, the list of grounds for the use of Collective Rapid Reaction Forces was expanded to include the response to crisis situations that threaten security, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty member states.

In addition, an expanded range of threats was introduced to which member states were supposed to respond jointly. Among them were international terrorism and extremism, illegal trafficking in drugs and psychotropic substances, weapons, organized transnational crime, illegal migration, etc. To this end, the member states pledged to cooperate in the areas of protecting state borders, information exchange, information security, protecting the population and territories from natural and man-made emergencies, as well as from dangers arising during or as a result of military operations.

The Joint Headquarters was added to the permanent working bodies of the CSTO, and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization was declared a body of inter-parliamentary cooperation. In addition, the position of CSTO Secretary General appeared. Organizational changes came into effect on January 1, 2012.

Due to the expansion of the list of threats to which the CSTO intends to respond, in 2014 Collective Aviation Forces were created, responsible for the transportation of personnel and cargo, search and rescue activities, evacuation of the sick and wounded. For the same reason, the list of working and auxiliary bodies under the CSTO continued to expand. Thus, in 2013, a Coordination Meeting of Chief Narcologists was established at the Committee of Secretaries of Security Councils, in 2014 – the Computer Incidents Response Coordination Center, in 2016 – Working Group under the CSTO Defense Ministers Council for coordinating joint training of military personnel and scientific work, in 2021 – Coordination Council of authorized bodies on biological security. Expanding the list of CSTO bodies, existing on a permanent or temporary basis, rather leads to an increase in opportunities for cooperation between relevant departments on technical issues. Key decisions remain with the CSC, and therefore the level of trust in the CSTO apparatus remains limited.

The third protocol on amendments to the CSTO Charter was signed on November 8, 2018. It established an observer position for third countries and parties and the opportunity for parties interested in cooperation with the CSTO to obtain the status of a CSTO Partner. The Protocol only came into force in January 2021.

The latest changes to the CSTO Charter were made by the Fourth Protocol, signed on August 26, 2022 (ratified by Russia in April 2023, however, as of August 2023, ratification has not taken place in all CSTO member states). According to it, in particular, threats to biological security were included in the list of threats that the member states pledged to counteract jointly (Article 8). In addition, this protocol approved the possibility of early termination of the CSTO Secretary General powers by decision of the CSC on the proposal of the CSTO Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

#### **2.4. CSTO and the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh**

In April 2016, the largest escalation of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, otherwise known as the Four-Day War, took place since 1994. The parties accused each other of violating the ceasefire and carried out active hostilities for several days. The OSCE Minsk Group met in Vienna, whose participants condemned the violence and decided to send their representatives there. The President of Russia held telephone conversations with the leaders of conflicting sides. However, the CSTO did not interfere in the situation in its hot phase and only in October an official statement was made by the heads of member states on this matter, and then a similar one in November 2017, where the CSTO expressed solidarity with the decisions of the OSCE Minsk Group<sup>1</sup>.

In summer 2020 Azerbaijan began to occupy rapidly the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, where the status quo had been maintained for a long time. Armenia hoped for help from its CSTO allies, however, since Nagorno-Karabakh does not belong to the territory of Armenia, Azerbaijan's actions could not be qualified as aggression against one of the CSTO member states<sup>2</sup>.

Later, due to the tense situation on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, which Armenia considered as an encroachment on its own territory<sup>3</sup>, the Armenian side appealed to the CSTO, citing Article 2 of the Charter<sup>4</sup>. To avoid the CSTO being drawn into the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, the Russian side proposed creating a joint commission on border delimitation and demarcation<sup>5</sup>. At the same time, military assistance to Armenia as a member of the CSTO was never provided. Through the mediation of the Russian president, a ceasefire statement was signed on November 10, 2020.

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<sup>1</sup> Statement by the heads of state of the Collective Security Treaty Organization on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Yerevan, October 14, 2016). URL: <https://odkb-csto.org/documents/statements/zayavlenie-glav-gosudarstv-chlenov-organizatsii-dogovora-o-kollektivnoy-bezopasnosti-po-nagorno-kara/#loaded>

<sup>2</sup> Putin explained why the CSTO did not intervene in the Karabakh conflict (In Russ.) URL: <https://ria.ru/20201117/karabakh-1585078430.html>

<sup>3</sup> Armenia and Azerbaijan are stuck in a border state (In Russ.) URL: <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4816266>

<sup>4</sup> Nikol Pashinyan used diplomatic weapons (In Russ.) URL: <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4804894>

<sup>5</sup> Blockiness test (In Russ.) URL: <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4817450>

As a result, Azerbaijan was able to achieve the return of a significant part of Nagorno-Karabakh to its control. Russian peacekeeping forces deployed in Nagorno-Karabakh became guarantors of security<sup>1</sup>. The CSTO did not express official support for Armenia, while Azerbaijan more than once received such support from the Turkic Council, and then the Organization of Turkic States, which includes CSTO members Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan<sup>2</sup>.

The CSTO's non-intervention in the events in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 and in the conflict around Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 largely contributed to perpetuating low expectations among CSTO member states regarding the applicability of the created instruments in crisis conditions. The Russian side each time tried to stabilize the situation through bilateral interaction, thereby unwittingly eroding the status of the CSTO as a capable guarantor of security in the region. The actual non-interference of the CSTO in the situation of the border conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, two member states of the Organization, did not improve the situation.

## **2.5. Peacekeeping in Kazakhstan**

The events of January 2022 in Kazakhstan shocked not only the Kazakh state itself, but also its neighbors, including the CSTO countries. Having begun with public protests caused by rising gas prices in the city of Zhanaozen, the crisis escalated into large-scale clashes with the use of weapons and an attempt to remove the current President K.-Zh. Tokaeva. The latter, as a means of stabilizing the situation, decided to turn to the CSTO, justifying this by the fact that aggression had been launched against Kazakhstan by terrorist gangs trained abroad, threatening the territorial integrity of the country<sup>3</sup>.

The CSTO peacekeeping mission was promptly prepared and deployed in Kazakhstan mainly with the use of Russian military transport. More than 2 thousand peacekeepers from all CSTO member states took part in it: representatives of the 45th separate brigade, the 98th airborne brigade and the 310th separate airborne assault brigade of the Russian Airborne Forces (1,480 people); 103rd separate airborne brigade of the Special Forces of Belarus (100 people); 25th special forces brigade "Scorpion" of the Armed Forces of Kyrgyzstan (150 people) and peacekeeping units of the Armed Forces of Armenia (100 people) and Tajikistan (200 people)<sup>4</sup>. Peacekeepers took protection of socially important objects, including infrastructure: the airport and government buildings, thermal

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<sup>1</sup> Statement by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and the President of the Russian Federation (In Russ.) URL: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64384>

<sup>2</sup> Statement of Secretary General of the Turkic Council on Nagorno-Karabakh settlement (10.11.2020). URL: [https://turkicstates.org/en/haberler/statement-of-secretary-general-of-the-turkic-council-on-nagorno-karabakh-settlement\\_2107](https://turkicstates.org/en/haberler/statement-of-secretary-general-of-the-turkic-council-on-nagorno-karabakh-settlement_2107)

<sup>3</sup> Tokayev said that he turned to the leaders of the CSTO countries for help (In Russ.) URL: [t.me/rian\\_ru/137892](https://t.me/rian_ru/137892)

<sup>4</sup> CSTO peacekeepers in Kazakhstan: composition and main task of the mission (In Russ.) URL: [https://ria.ru/20220110/mirotvortsy\\_kazakhstan-1767231827.html](https://ria.ru/20220110/mirotvortsy_kazakhstan-1767231827.html)

power plant in Almaty<sup>1</sup>. It took about a week to stabilize the situation, after which within a few days the CSTO peacekeepers were withdrawn from the territory of Kazakhstan.

Despite the imminent completion of the CSTO mission in Kazakhstan, its assessments by the expert community turned out to be ambiguous. For Kazakhstan, the very appeal to the CSTO turned out to be a traumatic experience, revealing its inability to independently get out of the crisis and the degree of dependence on its allies. In this regard, for example, Kazakh analysts strongly emphasized the secondary and sometimes insignificant role of the CSTO forces in overcoming the crisis<sup>2</sup>.

For the CSTO, the events in Kazakhstan in January 2022 became the first real use of the peacekeeping forces created under the Agreement on Peacekeeping Activities of the CSTO of 2007. Considering the prompt resolution of the situation by the peacekeepers, the participation of the CSTO contributed, at least temporarily, to increasing its prestige<sup>3</sup>.

In general, however, the existence of the CSTO has not ensured coherence of positions between member states on most security issues, much less on foreign policy issues. Numerous tests for the CSTO, up to the peacekeeping mission in Kazakhstan in January 2022, rather proved the reluctance of the Organization and its member states to interfere in regional and intrastate conflicts.

## **2.6. CSTO interaction with other international organizations**

Due to the limited results of the CSTO participation in resolving conflicts in the post-Soviet area, the Organization made attempts to increase its potential by strengthening its status at the international arena by establishing horizontal connections. Thus, in 2004, the UN General Assembly granted observer status to the association. The purpose of increasing the international prestige of the CSTO was the introduction of an observer position for third countries and parties, and subsequently the status of a CSTO partner.

The CSTO interacts actively with such international organizations as the CIS and the SCO, which is due to the geographical location of its member states and the profile of their security activities.

On December 14, 2009, a Memorandum of Cooperation was signed between the CIS Executive Committee and the CSTO Secretariat, providing for joint consultations, preparation of agreed proposals for CIS and CSTO bodies, exchange of information, work plans, reference, information-analytical and other materials of mutual interest, cooperation in the formation of the legal framework,

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<sup>1</sup> CSTO peacekeeping mission in Kazakhstan: first and successful (In Russ.) URL: <https://ru.sputnik.kz/20220119/mirotvorcheskaya-missiya-odkb-kazakhstan-19176096.html>

<sup>2</sup> Abishev G. Despite the appeal to the CSTO, all the main hard work, everything must be done by Kazakh officers // Telegram (In Russ.). URL: <https://t.me/gaziz1984/2720>; Karin E. As has been said several times, the CSTO mission is exclusively peacekeeping // Telegram. (In Russ.) URL: <https://t.me/erlankarin/600>

<sup>3</sup> Novikova S.D. The role of the CSTO in resolving the internal political crisis in Kazakhstan in 2022 // RIAC, 02.20.2023 (In Russ.) URL: <https://russiancouncil.ru/blogs/CIS-NSO-MGIMO/rol-odkb-v-uregulirovanii-vnutripoliticheskogo-krizisa-v-kazakhstane-v/>



development of agreed positions in relations with the working bodies of other international organizations. The most active interaction between organizations developed in countering international terrorism on the basis of the Memorandum of Cooperation between the CSTO Secretariat and the CIS Anti-Terrorism Center in 2011, which established a systematic exchange of information and the possibility of mutual participation as observers in the events and exercises of the opposite side<sup>1</sup>.

On October 5, 2007, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed in Dushanbe between the secretariats of the SCO and the CSTO, which provided for consultations and exchange of information on issues of mutual interest<sup>2</sup>. Interaction with the SCO concerns, first of all, countering international terrorism and extremism, combating illicit drug and weapons trafficking, and transnational crime, which was enshrined in the 2011 Protocol on Cooperation. In May 2018, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure, the CIS Anti-Terrorism Center and the CSTO Secretariat. At the same time, a tripartite expert group began working. The commonality of approaches of the three organizations to the fight against international terrorism was noted during a joint meeting of the defense ministers of the SCO, CIS and CSTO countries in September 2020 in Moscow<sup>3</sup> and in the joint position of the specialized anti-terrorist structures of the SCO, CIS and the CSTO Secretariat adopted in 2022<sup>4</sup>.

Cooperation between the CSTO, the CIS and the SCO is also developing in military issues. It includes joint activities, but full-scale trilateral exercises under the auspices of these international organizations have not yet been held. At the same time, working meetings of senior administrative officials of organizations are held regularly. The CSTO Secretary General regularly participates in CIS and SCO summits.

The CSTO is also developing cooperation with the UN, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Interaction with the latter developed, in particular, at the level of the Secretaries General. In 2007, the practice of mutual speeches by the Secretaries General at

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<sup>1</sup> Memorandum of cooperation between the Secretariat of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Anti-Terrorism Center of the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (In Russ.). URL: [https://antiterror.odkb-csto.org/int\\_organizations/cis/memorandum-o-sotrudnichestve-mezhdu-sekretariatom-odkb-i-attn-sng/#loaded](https://antiterror.odkb-csto.org/int_organizations/cis/memorandum-o-sotrudnichestve-mezhdu-sekretariatom-odkb-i-attn-sng/#loaded)

<sup>2</sup> Memorandum of understanding between the Secretariat of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Secretariat of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (In Russ.) URL: <https://docs.cntd.ru/document/902383860>

<sup>3</sup> Joint communique of the participants of the joint meeting of the ministers of defense (heads of defense departments) of the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States and member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (In Russ.) URL: <https://odkb-csto.org/documents/accepted-docs/sovместnoe-kommyunike-uchastnikov-sovmestnogo-zasedaniya-ministrov-oborony-gosudarstv-chlenov-shos-g/#loaded>

<sup>4</sup> Joint position of the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure, the Anti-Terrorism Center of the CIS Member States and the CSTO Secretariat on issues of countering terrorism and extremism (In Russ.) URL: <https://odkb-csto.org/documents/accepted-docs/sovместnaya-pozitsiya-regionalnoy-antiterroristicheskoy-shos-antiterroristicheskogo-tsentr/#loaded>

meetings of the permanent bodies of the two organizations was introduced, as well as the practice of working meetings on the sidelines of other events. The priority of cooperation between the CSTO and the OSCE is countering international terrorism. Interaction between the CSTO and the OSCE Anti-Terrorism Unit and the OSCE Conflict Prevention Center has been established<sup>1</sup>.

The CSTO's relations with the NATO remained difficult. Since 2004, the CSTO Secretary General and the CSTO Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs had made attempts to establish a dialogue with NATO on issues of joint countering international terrorism and establishing consultations on security issues. However, these proposals were not supported by NATO due to the position of the United States, which regards cooperation with individual CSTO member states more effective<sup>2</sup>. After the start of the Special Military Operation in February 2022, further attempts to establish cooperation between the CSTO and NATO ceased due to the position of Western countries towards Russia. In general, the negative dynamics of interaction between the CSTO and the NATO is explained by the US refusal to recognize Russia's interests in the post-Soviet area, including security ones. On the contrary, contradictions between the CSTO member states on issues key to Russian interests, provide opportunities for the United States to intensify bilateral contacts for its own purposes.

Thus, the interaction of the CSTO with international organizations is more of a technical nature or carried out as an exchange of opinions.

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<sup>1</sup> Collective Security Treaty Organization (In Russ.) URL: <https://odkb-csto.org/30-let-odkb/presentation2022.pdf>

<sup>2</sup> NATO refused to cooperate with the CSTO (In Russ.) URL: [https://odkb-csto.org/news/smi/nato\\_otkazalsya\\_sotrudnichat\\_s\\_odkb/#loaded](https://odkb-csto.org/news/smi/nato_otkazalsya_sotrudnichat_s_odkb/#loaded)

### 3. CSTO nowadays (2022 – 2023)

#### 3.1. CSTO adaptation to new realities

The Ukrainian crisis, which grew into a large-scale conflict in February 2022, changed significantly the international political and military-strategic conditions of the CSTO. The impact of the events of 2022 on the geopolitical environment can be summarized into several main conclusions necessary for understanding the foreign policy context in which the Organization operates.

Firstly, the escalation of the situation in Ukraine has become the quintessential crisis of the world order that has emerged since the end of the Cold War. During the conflict, the United States and its allies counted on military defeat and economic exhaustion of Russia. Moscow, in turn, has demonstrated its willingness and ability to effectively manage high costs to achieve its foreign policy and national security goals.

Secondly, the Ukrainian conflict has led to further rapprochement between Russia and China. In the context of systemic contradictions between the Russian Federation and Western countries, relations of “comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction in a new era” were able to develop into a reliable interstate alliance, while the interaction between Beijing and Washington maintains a negative dynamic.

Thirdly, the conflict over Ukraine contributed to the strengthening of Turkey’s role as a regional and global player. Currently Ankara has received new opportunities to pursue a more independent foreign policy, while simultaneously strengthening its own status in the NATO and maintaining constructive relations with Russia, strengthening its positions in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. Finally, the situation in Ukraine demonstrated the ineffectiveness of international and Western institutions created to prevent and resolve such situations, and called into question the reliability of multilateral agreements and the fragility of seemingly unshakably strong norms and rules.

Thus, the main challenge for the CSTO is maintaining the functioning of its current membership. At the moment, the prospects for leaving the association were discussed only in Armenia. The Statement, signed by the leaders of the CSTO countries in May 2022 in connection with the 30th anniversary of the Tashkent Treaty and the 20th anniversary of the Organization, noted the importance of member states’ efforts in maintaining peace and security in Eurasia, emphasizing the CSTO’s intentions to further improve the structure and expand activities in main areas<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Statement by the CSTO Collective Security Council in connection with the 30th anniversary of the Collective Security Treaty and the 20th anniversary of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (In Russ.) URL: <https://odkb-csto.org/documents/statements/zayavlenie-soveta-kollektivnoy-bezopasnosti-organizatsii-dogovora-o-kollektivnoy-bezopasnosti-v-svya/#loaded>

In 2022 under the unprecedented international crisis, the CSTO member states were able to continue effective interaction in four main areas, including administrative activities, rule-making, organization of joint exercises and personnel training, and foreign policy cooperation.

Thus, in December 2022, a meeting of the new CSTO working body, the Coordination Council on Biological Security, was held for the first time. It was decided to synchronize the terms of the CSC chairmanship with the calendar year. In July 2023, a meeting of the heads of communications management bodies of the defense ministries was held, at which the possibility of developing uniform standards and protocols in the field of military development was discussed<sup>1</sup>.

In 2022, the regulatory framework for the CSTO activities was supplemented and expanded. In November, at the CSC session in Yerevan, important decisions were adopted for the further development of military potential including those concerning joint formation of radiation, chemical, biological protection and medical support, equipping the CSTO Peacekeeping Forces with modern weapons and the CSTO communication system<sup>2</sup>. The set of operational and preventive measures, aimed at combating the recruitment of citizens by terrorist organizations, received the status of a permanent regional anti-terrorist operation. In March 2023 an agreement on jurisdiction and the provision of legal assistance in cases related to the temporary presence of forces and means of the collective security system on the territories of member states came into force. Also, as ratification occurs within the member countries of the association, the agreement signed in 2021 on joint logistics and medical support for the collective forces of the CSTO and the protocol to the agreement on CSTO peacekeeping activities, regulating the concept of “coordinating state,” will come into force<sup>3</sup>.

The third area of cooperation within the Organization nowadays includes expanding the list of joint exercises. In September–October 2022, the CSTO Collective Forces exercises “Interaction-2022”, “Search-2022” and “Echelon-2022” were held in Kazakhstan, and the exercises “Rubezh-2022” were held in Tajikistan. In 2023, the CSTO member states agreed to conduct exercises in Belarus (“Interaction-2023”, the exercise of intelligence units “Poisk-2023”, the exercise of logistics units of the collective forces of the CSTO “Echelon-2023”, an exercise with joint formation of radiation and chemical protection and medical support “Barrier-2023”, a special exercise with units of the Ministry of Emergency Situations “Skala-2023” took place in September 2023) and Kyrgyzstan

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<sup>1</sup> A working meeting of the heads of communications management bodies of the defense departments of the CSTO member states took place (In Russ.) URL: [https://function.mil.ru/news\\_page/country/more.htm?id=12473975@eg-News](https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12473975@eg-News)

<sup>2</sup> List of documents signed at the session of the CSTO Collective Security Council (In Russ.) URL: <http://kremlin.ru/supplement/5868>

<sup>3</sup> Protocol on amendments to the Agreement on peacekeeping activities of the CSTO dated October 6, 2007 (In Russ.) URL: <https://docs.cntd.ru/document/350249389>

(exercises of the CSTO peacekeeping forces "Indestructible Brotherhood-2023" - took place in October 2023)<sup>1</sup>.

An important area of CSTO activity in 2022 remained the training of military personnel. 1,871 people were accepted to study under the CSTO quota in 59 military educational institutions in Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Armenia<sup>2</sup> (previously, enrollment was up to 2.6 thousand people per year).

Taking into account current international situation and the refusal of many states to maintain relations with Russia, one of the key member states of the CSTO, the Organization is expanding cooperation with interested countries and organizations outside the West. Thus, in March 2023, a joint statement following the Russian-Chinese summit noted "the positive contribution of the Organization ... to ensuring regional security" and "the potential for developing cooperation between the CSTO and the People's Republic of China in order to ensure peace and stability in the region"<sup>3</sup>. In addition, in November 2022, at the CSC session, a decision was adopted to develop interaction with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). According to representatives of the CSTO Secretariat, "there is great prospect for a new format of relations between the CSTO and the SCO"<sup>4</sup>. At the same time, fundamental differences between the Organizations (the SCO is not a military-political alliance, and one of its leading members, India, has the status of the United States' main defense partner) does not yet allow to see the contours of this "new format."

### **3.2. Exacerbation of old problems and emergence of new contradictions**

The Ukrainian crisis became one of the factors that contributed to the exacerbation of chronic problems and the identification of new contradictions within the CSTO.

The inability of the CSTO to ensure real coordination of the member states' foreign policy became obvious: the member states, with the exception of Belarus, did not express solidarity with Russia on the situation in Ukraine<sup>5</sup>. The tendency to use CSTO membership as a tool for political bargaining and pressure on Russia has intensified. Thus, Kyrgyzstan canceled the "Indestructible Brotherhood 2022" exercises planned for October 2022. Armenia also refrained from participating in the CSTO exercises in 2022, and in January 2023 announced its refusal to hold the "Indestructible

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<sup>1</sup> First staff negotiations on the preparation of joint exercises with collective forces in 2023 (In Russ.) URL: [https://jscsto.org/news/10381/?sphrase\\_id=2539](https://jscsto.org/news/10381/?sphrase_id=2539)

<sup>2</sup> Sidorov A.A. Two decades in a single combat formation (In Russ.) URL: <https://army.ric.mil.ru/Stati/item/483206/>

<sup>3</sup> Joint statement of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on deepening relations of comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction entering a new era (In Russ.) URL: <http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/5920>

<sup>4</sup> CSTO Secretariat: a new format of relations between the CSTO and China and the SCO is being built (In Russ.) URL: <https://www.belta.by/politics/view/sekretariat-odkb-vystraivaetsja-novyj-format-otnoshenij-odkb-s-kitaem-i-shos-558444-2023/>

<sup>5</sup> For instance: Abstract from the article by Kassym-Jomart Tokayev "Turbulence Across Eurasia Will Not Slow Kazakhstan's Progress" (04 April 2022). URL: <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/turbulence-across-eurasia-will-not-slow-kazakhstan%E2%80%99s-progress-201591>

Brotherhood 2023” exercises on its territory. The adoption of the CSC decision “On improving the crisis response system”, agreed upon in spring 2022, was also postponed. In general, despite differences in assessments of Russian foreign policy, the CSTO member states took a restrained position on the Ukrainian conflict, which, on the one hand, allowed support the current activities of the Organization, on the other hand, it increased internal tensions within the alliance.

For Russia, the Ukrainian crisis has sharply increased the importance of the military and political alliance with **Belarus** which found itself in close proximity to the front line. The very preservation of the model of Belarusian statehood that has developed over 30 years and the format of Russian-Belarusian relations has become inextricably linked with the outcome of the Ukrainian conflict. In official rhetoric, Minsk demonstrates differences with Moscow on many nuances of assessing the situation in Ukraine, but in general it shares the position of the Russian Federation and provides it with political, military and logistical support. An important step on the part of Belarus, demonstrating the importance of Russia as a strategic partner, was the rejection of Kyiv’s proposal to conclude a “non-aggression pact”<sup>1</sup>. The decision to deploy Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus in March 2023 also highlights the high stage of military integration between Moscow and Minsk. However, Russian-Belarusian military-political interaction is developing outside the framework of the CSTO and does not directly contribute to strengthening the association. On the contrary, such a rapprochement causes a wary attitude among other members of the Organization<sup>2</sup>.

Nevertheless, the draft of the new National Security Concept of Belarus, published in March 2023, provides for the country’s readiness to actively participate in “the activities of the CSTO, which is an integral component of ensuring international and Eurasian security,” and in increasing “the effectiveness of military command and control bodies, forces and means collective security of the CSTO”<sup>3</sup>.

The Ukrainian crisis has negatively influenced the already difficult strategic situation around **Armenia**. The strengthening of Turkey’s regional and global role and Russia’s unwillingness to aggravate contradictions with Ankara and Baku contributed to the escalation of the conflict situation on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border in September 2022 and in the Lachin corridor in December 2022.

In September 2022, due to the aggravation of contradictions between Yerevan and Baku, an extraordinary session of the Joint Security Council was held, at which it was decided to send a CSTO mission led by the Secretary General and the Chief of the Joint Staff to Armenia to assess the

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<sup>1</sup> Lukashenko announced Ukraine’s proposal to conclude a non-aggression pact (In Russ.) URL: <https://www.forbes.ru/society/484110-lukasenko-soobsil-o-predlozenii-ukrainy-zaklucit-pakt-o-nenapadenii>

<sup>2</sup> Tokayev announced the phenomenon of one nuclear weapon for two (In Russ.) URL: <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/24/05/2023/646e37859a79476721ed0252>

<sup>3</sup> Concept of national security of the Republic of Belarus. Project (In Russ.) URL: <https://pravo.by/document/?guid=3871&p0=P223s0001>

situation and entrust its further monitoring to the CSTO<sup>1</sup>. The reaction to the events within the CSTO member states was ambiguous: Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan indicated that they did not share the position of Armenia, and Astana and Bishkek, members of the Organization of Turkic States, expressed support for Azerbaijan.

The steps taken by the CSTO were perceived by Yerevan as insufficient. In September, the issue of the country's withdrawal from the Organization in 2022 was discussed at a meeting of the Security Council of Armenia. In November 2022, the country's Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan refused to sign the final declaration of the CSTO summit and the CSC decision on joint measures to assist Armenia, providing for the deployment of a CSTO observer mission on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, and demanded a "political assessment of Azerbaijan's aggression"<sup>2</sup>. In May 2023, N. Pashinyan stated that the association itself was "leaving Armenia" and again stated that he did not rule out "suspension or freezing of membership in the CSTO"<sup>3</sup>. The CSTO mission in Armenia never appeared.

On September 19-20, 2023, Azerbaijan conducted an "anti-terrorist operation" in Nagorno-Karabakh, which led to the defeat of the armed forces of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) and the beginning of a mass exodus of the Armenian population from Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. The President of the NKR signed a decree on the termination of the existence of the NKR from January 1, 2024.

The leadership of Armenia placed responsibility for the events in Karabakh not only on Azerbaijan, but also on the Russian peacekeeping contingent stationed in the unrecognized republic. On September 24, N. Pashinyan, in an address to the nation, stated that "the security systems and allies that we have relied on for many years have set themselves the task of flaunting our vulnerability and justifying the impossibility of the Armenian people to have an independent state." The leader of Armenia emphasized the need to "transform, complement and enrich the external and internal security instruments of the Republic of Armenia"<sup>4</sup>

Russia's response to the Armenian leadership was unprecedentedly harsh. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that "the processes that are destructive for our own country and our allied relations, inspired by the West and spurred on by official Yerevan, are not episodic, but systemic

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<sup>1</sup> CSTO press-release issued on September 14, 2022 (In Russ.) URL: [https://odkb-csto.org/news/news\\_odkb/na-vneo-cherednoy-sessii-soveta-kollektivnoy-bezopasnosti-odkb-obsudili-situatsiyu-v-svyazi-s-rezkim-/#loaded](https://odkb-csto.org/news/news_odkb/na-vneo-cherednoy-sessii-soveta-kollektivnoy-bezopasnosti-odkb-obsudili-situatsiyu-v-svyazi-s-rezkim-/#loaded)

<sup>2</sup> Pashinyan refused to sign the declaration following the CSTO summit (In Russ.) URL: <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/23/11/2022/637e67d89a794715b6c15a44>

<sup>3</sup> Pashinyan allowed Armenia to leave the CSTO // RBC. URL: <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/22/05/2023/646b35829a7947738c92b60b>

<sup>4</sup> Message from Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on Independence (In Russ.) URL: <https://www.primeminister.am/ru/statements-and-messages/item/2023/09/24/Nikol-Pashinyan-messages/>

in nature.”<sup>1</sup>. On September 27, the Russian Foreign Ministry noted that the United States and the EU “convince Armenia to leave the CSTO and speed up cooperation with NATO”<sup>2</sup>.

As a result of the events of September 2023, the likelihood of Armenia suspending its membership in the CSTO has increased significantly, however, it can be assumed that Yerevan will be held back from this step by fears for the territorial integrity of Armenia itself, through whose territory Azerbaijan and Turkey intend to build Zangezur corridor connecting Azerbaijan with the Nakhichevan Autonomous Region and Turkey.

For the authorities **Kazakhstan** under the leadership of President K.-J. Tokayev, the Ukrainian crisis has significantly complicated the solution of domestic political problems and the implementation of a multi-vector foreign policy course. On the one hand, due to the events of January 2022, the tasks of retaining power, socio-political consolidation and reforms, providing guarantees for foreign investors, the need to mitigate and level out sanctions risks for the economy of Kazakhstan led to increased cooperation between the country and the US and the EU. On the other hand, the Russian leadership, which provided the new leader of Kazakhstan with significant assistance during the CSTO peacekeeping mission, expected that Astana would take at least a neutral position regarding the situation in Ukraine.

The Kazakh authorities appealed to the principle of territorial integrity and publicly refused to recognize the independence of the Donetsk and Lugansk<sup>3</sup>, and also called on both sides for a diplomatic settlement and offered their mediation services, citing “very good, good relations” with both Ukraine and with Russia<sup>4</sup>. Also, Kazakhstan, like most other CSTO countries, regularly abstained or voted against anti-Russian resolutions in the UN General Assembly. However, in April 2023, the country, together with Armenia, supported UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/77/284, the preamble of which contains a provision on “aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine”<sup>5</sup>.

At the same time, Astana declared a course towards maintaining “truly allied relations of strategic partnership”<sup>6</sup> with Russia both at the bilateral and multilateral levels, including within the CSTO.

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<sup>1</sup> Statement by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (In Russ.) URL: [https://mid.ru/ru/foreign\\_policy/news/1906229/](https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1906229/)

<sup>2</sup> Zakharova: The USA and the EU are convincing Armenia to leave the CSTO (In Russ.) URL: <https://www.pnp.ru/politics/zakharova-ssha-i-es-ubezhdaet-armeniyu-vyyti-iz-odkb.html>

<sup>3</sup> Abstract from the article by Kassym-Jomart Tokayev "Turbulence Across Eurasia Will Not Slow Kazakhstan's Progress" (04 April 2022). URL: <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/turbulence-across-eurasia-will-not-slow-kazakhstan%E2%80%99s-progress-201591>

<sup>4</sup> The Kazakh Foreign Ministry refused to take a position in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine (In Russ.) URL: <https://www.interfax.ru/world/825643>

<sup>5</sup> Cooperation between the United Nations and the Council of Europe. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on April 26, 2023. URL: [https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4010475/files/A\\_RES\\_77\\_284-RU.pdf?ln=en](https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4010475/files/A_RES_77_284-RU.pdf?ln=en)

<sup>6</sup> Kassym-Jomart Tokayev congratulated Vladimir Putin on the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Kazakhstan and Russia (In Russ.) URL: <https://akorda.kz/ru/kasym-zhomart-tokayev-pozdravil-vladimira-putina-s-30-letiem-so-dnya-ustanovleniya-diplomaticheskikh-otnosheniy-mezhdu-kazahstanom-i-rossiyey-2292811>



Back in January 2022, in response to the deployment of a peacekeeping operation in Kazakhstan, K.-J. Tokayev thanked his fellow presidents for the “political and even military brotherhood”, assessed it as “a turning point in the development of the organization, which has acquired new qualities as a strong international institution” and promised that the country would contribute to strengthening the “powerful potential of the CSTO”<sup>1</sup>. Later, the rhetoric of the leader of Kazakhstan regarding the Organization became more restrained, and the emphasis in his version of the priority areas of the CSTO’s activities was placed on the development of peacekeeping potential and challenges related to the situation in Afghanistan.

The Kazakh authorities have more than once publicly denied rumors about the country’s intention to leave the CSTO, pointing out that membership in the association fully meets national interests. Astana’s desire to further strengthen the partnership within the CSTO is evidenced by its readiness to bring national legislation into line with the legal framework of the association. In particular, on May 31, 2023, the Lower Chamber of Kazakhstan Parliament ratified the Agreement on joint logistics and medical support for the CSTO troops, the Agreement on jurisdiction and legal assistance in cases related to the temporary presence of formations, forces and means in the collective security system on the territories of the CSTO member states, and the Protocol on Amendments to the Agreement on Peacekeeping Activities of the CSTO adopted on October 6, 2007. However, final ratification of the documents also requires the consent of the Senate of Kazakhstan.

The conflict in Ukraine did not have a significant impact on Russian-Kazakh relations and the country’s policy towards the CSTO, however, the overall dynamics of the situation may change for the worse if pressure on Kazakhstan from Western countries increases.

Authorities of **Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan** also took a neutral position on the Ukrainian crisis. At the same time, Kyrgyzstan’s rhetoric towards Russia may be regarded as generally positive. In particular, the post of the country's President S. Zhaparov, published on Facebook<sup>2</sup> on February 22, 2022, contains the assumption that Russia's recognition of the independence of Donetsk and Lugansk became a forced measure to protect the civilian population of the Donbass territories, where a large number of Russian citizens live. Also, according to the Russian side, on February 26, 2022, in a telephone conversation with Russian President V.V. Putin, the head of Kyrgyzstan noted Kyiv’s responsibility for the failure of the Minsk agreements and expressed support for the decisive actions of the Russian side to protect the civilian population of Donbass, which increased tension in diplomatic relations between Bishkek and Kyiv<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Session of the CSTO Collective Security Council (In Russ.) URL: <http://kremlin.ru/catalog/keywords/18/events/67568>

<sup>2</sup> Facebook, product of Meta, which is recognized as an extremist organization and banned in Russia.

<sup>3</sup> A note from the press-release on the telephone conversation with the President of Kyrgyzstan S. Zhaparov (26 February 2022) (In Russ.) URL: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67869>

Further development of comprehensive ties with Russia and active participation in the work of CSTO institutions and mechanisms is a strategic priority for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, since both parties are interested in ensuring their own national security.

Firstly, over a long period of time, persistent tensions on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border have repeatedly led to exchanges of fire between the military of both countries. According to the CSTO Secretariat, the border problem was repeatedly discussed, including at sessions of the CSC, but no official decisions were made on this issue. The conflict entered its most active phase on September 14–17, 2022. However, the association's participation in resolving the re-escalation in the fall of 2022 was limited to telephone conversations between CSTO Secretary General S. Zas and the secretaries of the security councils of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Russia made mediation efforts: on September 18, 2022, telephone conversations took place with V.V. Putin with the presidents of the conflicting countries, October 13 - face-to-face trilateral negotiations in Astana on the sidelines of the summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia. At this meeting, Moscow planned to propose a settlement of the border issue in a trilateral format<sup>1</sup>, which caused a restrained reaction from Dushanbe, which is interested in the bilateral mechanism<sup>2</sup>. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan resumed negotiations on the border conflict, but the parties failed to achieve significant results on controversial issues. In the near future, the resumption of the work of checkpoints on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border, closed on the Kyrgyz side in April 2021, is not possible due to ongoing clashes.

Secondly, for all Central Asian CSTO countries, the situation in Afghanistan is of utmost importance. The coming to power of the Taliban movement<sup>3</sup> in August 2021 led to the formation of a whole range of challenges for regional security. The terrorist threat is of particular concern to the countries of Central Asia. According to the statement of the President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon at a meeting of the Council of Security Council on January 10, 2022, in the northeastern provinces of Afghanistan there were more than 40 camps and terrorist training centers, in which there were more than 6 thousand militants. E. Rahmon expressed concern about the lack of a targeted interstate program to strengthen the Tajik-Afghan border and called for the creation of a "security belt" around Afghanistan<sup>4</sup>. Regular reports of shootings on the Tajik-Afghan border during 2022–2023. indicate the vulnerability of Tajikistan's national security to an external threat.

Due to the difficulties of developing a unified course by the Central Asian members of the CSTO, the association did not provide operational assistance to Dushanbe. Thus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan

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<sup>1</sup> During his visit to Astana, Putin will meet with Rakhmon and Japarov (In Russ.) URL: <https://ria.ru/20221012/vstrecha-1823452454.html>

<sup>2</sup> Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are quarreling loudly (In Russ.) URL: <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5619937>

<sup>3</sup> An organization whose activities are prohibited in Russia.

<sup>4</sup> Session of the CSTO Collective Security Council (In Russ.) URL: <http://kremlin.ru/catalog/keywords/18/events/67568>

and Russia do not formally recognize the Taliban regime<sup>1</sup>, however, they maintain contacts with him at the official level and hope that strengthening the movement will contribute to political stabilization in the country. In turn, Tajikistan supports the opposition to Taliban<sup>2</sup> - The National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (NRF), led by a representative of the Tajik community, Ahmad Masoud Jr.

At the same time, the strengthening of the Afghan cells of ISIS<sup>3</sup> and the internal crisis in the FNSA<sup>4</sup> nevertheless contributed to the rapprochement of the positions of the CSTO countries. In March 2023, the Taliban delegation<sup>5</sup> visited Tajikistan for the first time and took control of the consulate in Khorog. On June 20, 2023, the foreign ministers of the CSTO countries adopted a joint statement on the situation in Afghanistan. The document contains an appeal to the current authorities, a call on the international community to continue providing assistance to the Afghan people, including in the matter of lifting unilateral sanctions, support for measures to strengthen sections of the Tajik-Afghan border and initiatives to create a “security belt” around Afghanistan<sup>6</sup>.

At the CSTO summit on September 16, 2021, the countries agreed to “accelerate work on the adoption of the Targeted Interstate Program proposed by Tajikistan to strengthen the Tajik-Afghan border”<sup>7</sup>. It was not possible to agree on the document, despite the fact that its idea was approved by the member countries back in 2013. As a result, the basis for the security of the Tajik-Afghan border continues to be bilateral interaction between Russia and Tajikistan, which includes the use of the forces of the 201st Russian military base in Tajikistan, joint Russian-Tajik exercises, supply of Russian military equipment for Dushanbe. Kazakhstan has recently been providing military and technical assistance to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Russia's military potential often compensated for the CSTO's inability to provide prompt assistance in resolving conflict situations both between member states and to counter external risks. Information that appeared after the start of the Special Military Operation about the transfer of part of Russia's foreign military contingents to Ukraine, including those stationed in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, became a reason for a number of media to question the country's position in Central Asia.

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<sup>1</sup> An organization whose activities are prohibited in Russia.

<sup>2</sup> The Taliban movement is an organization whose activities are prohibited in Russia.

<sup>3</sup> An organization whose activities are prohibited in Russia.

<sup>4</sup> Subbotin I. Bomb under diplomacy: how challenges in the Afghan security sector are changing // RIAC. 05/04/2023 (In Russ.) URL: [https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/bomba-pod-diplomatiyu-kak-menyayutsya-vyzovy-v-afganskoy-sfere-bezopasnosti/?sphrase\\_id=101467135](https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/bomba-pod-diplomatiyu-kak-menyayutsya-vyzovy-v-afganskoy-sfere-bezopasnosti/?sphrase_id=101467135)

<sup>5</sup> The Taliban movement is an organization whose activities are prohibited in Russia.

<sup>6</sup> Statement by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization on the situation in Afghanistan, June 20, 2023, Minsk (In Russ.) URL: <https://odkb-csto.org/documents/statements/zayavlenie-ministrov-inostrannykh-del-gosudarstv-chlenov-organizatsii-dogovora-o-kollektivnoy-bezop1/#loaded>

<sup>7</sup> On September 16, 2021 in Dushanbe, the Collective Security Council discussed the problems of international and regional security and their impact on the security of the CSTO member states (In Russ.) URL: <https://odkb-csto.org/session/2021/sovet-kollektivnoy-bezopasnosti-16-sentyabrya-v-dushanbe-obsudil-problemy-mezhdunarodnoy-i-regionaln/#loaded>

To refute such conclusions, the Russian Ministry of Defense has repeatedly voiced its interest in providing military and technical assistance to countries in the region and increasing the combat potential of Russian military bases and other response forces in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan<sup>1</sup>. As part of the stated goals, in April 2023, Russia and Tajikistan held their first joint military exercises that year. At the same time, given the concentration of the military potential of the Russian Federation in the Special Military Operation area, the issue of using CSTO resources for addressing the Afghanistan situation remains relevant, including the potentially broader contribution of other leading members of the bloc - Kazakhstan and Belarus.

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<sup>1</sup> The Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation made a report at a meeting of the heads of military departments of the countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in New Delhi (In Russ.) URL: [https://function.mil.ru/news\\_page/country/more.htm?id=12465597@egNews](https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12465597@egNews)

#### **4. The future of the CSTO and its place in the transforming security architecture of the post-Soviet area**

Despite the existing difficulties in developing a common line of response to conflicts in Eurasia, the CSTO still has significant potential as a military-political union. Under geopolitical instability, improving the institutional structure and decision-making mechanisms within the Organization is of particular importance for Russia, so initiatives from Moscow can become the main driver of the Organization's development.

As mentioned above, the first serious test for the CSTO in modern conditions was the development of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in 2022–2023. The reaction from the CSTO caused serious disappointment in Armenian society: Yerevan was not satisfied with the CSTO refusal to implement Article 4, since the participating countries do not recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as part of the territory of Armenia. The deployment of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 did not take place under the auspices of the CSTO and did not prevent the liquidation of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic during the lightning operation of the Azerbaijani army in the fall of 2023.

The second systemic challenge for the CSTO remains the armed conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, during which heavy artillery, tanks and mortars were used in spring 2021 and autumn 2022. Tensions between Bishkek and Dushanbe, members of a single structure with common goals and objectives, and the insufficient assistance from the CSTO in resolving them are also a serious problem for the Organization that calls into question its functionality.

The CSTO peacekeeping operation in Kazakhstan during January 2022 became the first successful example of using the CSTO military contingent to quickly respond to a threat to the national security of one of the member states. However, contradictions within the Organization have again escalated due to the Special Military Operation that began in February 2022 in Ukraine.

Nevertheless, the member states are trying to adapt the functioning of the association to new conditions. Only in 2020-2022 the CSTO member states' leaders held more than ten meetings at which they outlined their intention to deepen cooperation in security, discussed the future of the organization and pointed out the need to develop it to increase its effectiveness.

Taking into account the complex nature of the internal and external difficulties facing the CSTO, three scenarios for the transformation of the security architecture in the post-Soviet area can be identified, which could have a decisive impact on the development of the Organization.

##### **Scenario 1. "The Right of the Strong"**

Over the past decade, the states of the post-Soviet area have begun to increasingly use military force to resolve domestic and foreign political tensions. More and more frozen conflicts that arose

after the collapse of the USSR are being resolved by force. The Karabakh war in 2020 and the operation to liquidate the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in 2023, the border conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in 2020-2023, the Special Military Operation in Ukraine - all these are examples of attempts made in recent years to resolve contradictions by force.

In the context of escalating regional tensions and in the absence of a reaction from the CSTO, its importance as a guarantor of security and stability will decrease. The incapacity of the organization will lead to reduction in the number of its member states and loss of influence on the Eurasian security system.

### **Scenario 2. “Combat Brotherhood”**

The CSTO will continue to develop as a platform for expanding bilateral military-political and military-technical cooperation between Russia and other members of the association. An example of such partnership is Russian-Belarusian relations, which guarantee Minsk assistance in ensuring its own national security.

Russian experience in using modern equipment and weapons during the Special Military Operation, as well as new types of weapons can be used to provide military-technical assistance to CSTO partner countries in ensuring national security. Air defense and communications systems, unmanned marine and aerial vehicles, new models of armored vehicles - all this will eventually turn into an important item of Russian arms exports. To expand the practice of information exchange and develop practical recommendations, the Russian Federation provides expertise on the use of modern Russian weapons. In general, strategic cooperation within the CSTO allows Russia to still remain the largest supplier of weapons and military equipment to Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The presence of Russian military bases in Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan serves as a deterrent to the terrorist and extremist threat. The ratification in 2023 of the agreement between Russia and Kyrgyzstan on the creation of a Joint Regional Air Defense System, which was signed on August 16, 2022 in Moscow, demonstrates the prospect of developing the CSTO into the format of an umbrella structure for coordinating bilateral military-political and military-technical cooperation between Russia and other countries.

### **Scenario 3: “New Security Architecture”**

Resolving the Ukrainian crisis in a negotiated format will require the formation of a new regional security system, which will create conditions for the transformation of the CSTO into one of its elements and will ensure a reduction in the conflict potential in the post-Soviet area. In the medium term, the member states of the Organization will have to develop guarantees of stability and security of borders with the countries of Eastern Europe, the Transcaucasus and Central Asia; in the long term, they will have to work out the parameters for stabilizing the situation in conflict zones, ensuring a neutral status or a ban on military activity in certain geographical regions.

Despite the difficulties in finding agreement between member states, the CSTO will remain a significant mechanism for ensuring security in Eurasia.

## Conclusion

The report raises questions about the future of the CSTO and outlines the context in which member states will have to find solutions to unresolved problems and new challenges. The difficulties faced by the Organization do not imply simple settlement mechanisms: the Special Military Operation is becoming protracted, the military operation of Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh on September 19-20, 2023 again indicated the lack of consensus in the CSTO on issues of ensuring the security of Armenia and Yerevan's deep dissatisfaction with the activities of the Organization. There are still contradictions between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. A serious external threat is the Afghan problem, the severity of which was recalled by the visit of the leader of the anti-Taliban FNSA A. Masoud to Russia at the end of August 2023 and the Moscow consultation meeting on Afghanistan, held in September 2023 in Kazan.

It is important to note a circumstance that is often overlooked when assessing the activities of the CSTO. Initially, the Organization was created as a tool for resolving local crises. Thus, its concept does not involve responding to crises resulting from the collapse of the European security system and the foundations of the global world order. The discrepancy between the national interests of the majority of the CSTO member states on the most pressing security issues in the post-Soviet area is an objective circumstance that limits the CSTO effectiveness and reduces expectations from the Organization.

In such conditions, the line pursued by the CSTO to maintain neutrality regarding the Ukrainian crisis, search for minimal points of contact in the interests of the member states and progressively promote cooperation in traditional areas are the optimal tactics. However, an obvious problem is the lack of a long-term development strategy for the organization. Intensifying cooperation in this area should be the main task for Russian policy towards the CSTO, since Moscow has significant potential to influence the Organization.

On this path, the Organization may face difficult trajectories of developments, including, for example, Armenia's withdrawal from the CSTO. Nevertheless, while maintaining the bilateral Russian-Armenian alliance and the Russian peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh, a possible decision by Yerevan will have minor consequences for Russian interests in the Transcaucasus and the functioning of the CSTO as a whole. Then the fundamental task for the unification will be the resolution of Tajik-Kyrgyz contradictions and the formation of a strategy regarding Afghanistan.

In addition to internal factors, the CSTO activities are also influenced by foreign policy. Given the high degree of uncertainty, the report presents three scenarios for the CSTO future. The second of them - "Combat Brotherhood" - is proposed to be considered as a basic option. In future it may transform into the third scenario - "New Security Architecture". It can be assumed that in the context of the current crisis in international relations system, key regional players will come to the need for a constructive discussion on the future of Eurasian security. The CSTO will be able to take



part in it and make its meaningful contribution as an effective structure of multilateral interaction that has withstood the “perfect storm” of the first half of the 2020s.

## Appendix 1

### COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY<sup>1</sup>

dated May 15, 1992 *(as amended by the Protocol on amendments to the Collective Security Treaty of May 15, 1992, signed on December 10, 2010)*

Member States being the parties to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the “Member States”,

being guided by declarations on the sovereignty of the Independent States,  
taking into account creation by the Member States of own Armed forces,  
taking coordinated measures in the interests of collective security provision,  
recognizing the necessity of strict implementation of the signed treaties concerning reduction of armaments, Armed forces and trust strengthening,

**have agreed as follows:**

#### **Article 1**

The Member States shall confirm the obligation to abstain from use of force or threat by force in the interstate relations. They shall undertake to settle all disagreements among themselves and other states by peaceful means.

The Member States shall not enter military alliances or take part in any groups of the states, as well as in the actions against other Member State.

In case of creation in Europe and Asia of a collective security system and conclusion for this purpose of treaties for collective security to what the negotiating parties will steadily aspire, the Member States will immediately start consultations with each other for the purpose of making necessary amendments to this Treaty.

#### **Article 2**

The Member States shall consult with each other on all important issues of the international security affecting their interests, and coordinate positions on these issues.

In case of menace to safety, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty of one or several Member States or menace to international peace and safety of the Member States shall immediately launch the mechanism of joint consultations for the purpose of their positions coordination, develop and take measures for assistance to such Member States for the purpose of elimination of the arisen menace.

*(the paragraph is as amended by the Protocol on amendments to the Collective Security Treaty of May 15, 1992, signed on December 10, 2010).*

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<sup>1</sup> URL: [https://en.odkb-csto.org/documents/documents/dogovor\\_o\\_kollektivnoy\\_bezopasnosti/#loaded](https://en.odkb-csto.org/documents/documents/dogovor_o_kollektivnoy_bezopasnosti/#loaded)

### **Article 3**

The Member States shall form the Council for Collective Security consisting of the heads of the Member States.

*(the article is as amended by the Protocol on amendments to the Collective Security Treaty of May 15, 1992, signed on December 10, 2010).*

### **Article 4**

If one of the Member States undergoes aggression (armed attack menacing to safety, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty), it will be considered by the Member States as aggression (armed attack menacing to safety, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty) to all the Member States of this Treaty.

In case of aggression commission (armed attack menacing to safety, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty) to any of the Member States, all the other Member States at request of this Member State shall immediately provide the latter with the necessary help, including military one, as well as provide support by the means at their disposal in accordance with the right to collective defence pursuant to article 51 of the UN Charter.

The Member States shall immediately inform the United Nations Security Council on the measures taken on the basis of this article. When implementing these measures, the Member States shall adhere to the relevant provisions of the UN Charter.

*(the article is as amended by the Protocol on amendments to the Collective Security Treaty of May 15, 1992, signed on December 10, 2010).*

### **Article 5**

Coordination and ensuring of joint activity of the Member States according to this Treaty shall be provided by the Council for Collective Security of the Member States and the bodies created by the Council.

*(the article is as amended by the Protocol on amendments to the Collective Security Treaty of May 15, 1992, signed on December 10, 2010).*

### **Article 6**

Resolution on use of forces and means of collective security system according to articles 2 and 4 of this Treaty shall be adopted by the heads of the Member States.

Use of forces and means of the collective security system outside of the territory of the Member States may be carried out only in the interests of the international security according to the UN Charter and the laws of the Member States being parties hereto.

*(the article is as amended by the Protocol on amendments to the Collective Security Treaty of May 15, 1992, signed on December 10, 2010).*

### **Article 7**

Placement and functioning of objects of the collective security system in the territory of the Member States shall regulated by special agreements.

### **Article 8**

This Treaty shall not affect the rights and obligations under other existing bilateral and multilateral treaties and the agreements concluded by the Member States with other states, and is not intended against the third countries.

This Treaty shall not affect the right of the Member States to individual and collective defence against aggression according to the United Nations Charter.

The Member States shall undertake not to conclude international treaties incompatible with this Treaty.

### **Article 9**

Any questions which may arise between the Member States concerning interpretation or application of any provision of this Treaty shall be settled jointly, in the spirit of friendship, mutual respect and understanding.

Amendments hereto may be made at the initiative of one or several Member States and adopted on the basis of the mutual consent.

### **Article 10**

This Treaty shall be open for accession of all interested states sharing its goals and principles.

### **Article 11**

This Treaty is concluded for five years with following prolongation.

Any of the Member States shall have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it informs other members on its intention not later than six months prior to withdrawal and fulfils all the obligations following the withdrawal from this Treaty.

This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by each state which has signed it according to its constitutional procedures. Instruments of ratification shall be transferred for storage to the Secretary General of Council for Collective Security (of the Collective Security Treaty Organization), hereby appointed as the depositary.

*(the paragraph is as amended by the Protocol on amendments to the Collective Security Treaty of May 15, 1992, signed on December 10, 2010).*

This Treaty shall take effect immediately after delivery of the instruments of ratification to storage by the Member States which have signed it.

## Appendix 2

### CHARTER OF THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY ORGANIZATION<sup>1</sup>

dated October 07, 2002

*(as amended by the Protocol on amendments to the Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization of October 07, 2002, signed on December 10, 2010)*

Member States of the Collective Security Treaty of May 15, 1992 (the “Treaty”), acting in strict compliance with their obligations under the UN Charter, resolutions of the UN Security Council, being guided by the universally recognized principles of international law; striving for creation of favourable and stable conditions for full development of the Member States of the Treaty and ensuring of their safety, sovereignty and territorial integrity; confirming the commitment to the purposes and principles of the Treaty and to the international treaties and resolutions accepted thereunder; resolved to further develop and deepen the military and political cooperation in interests of providing and strengthening of the national, regional and international security; setting the goal to continue and increase the close and all-round allied relations in foreign policy, military and technical areas, as well as in the sphere of counteraction to the transnational challenges and menaces to the safety of states and peoples; being guided by intention to raise efficiency of activity under the Treaty, have agreed as follows:

#### **Chapter I. Establishment of the Collective Security Treaty Organization**

##### **Article 1**

Member States of the Treaty hereby establish the international regional Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), hereinafter referred to as the “Organization”.

*(the article is as amended by the Protocol on amendments to the Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization of October 07, 2002, signed on December 10, 2010).*

##### **Article 2**

Provisions of the Treaty and the international treaties and resolutions of the Council for Collective Security of the Treaty adopted thereunder shall be binding for the Member States of the Organization (the “Member States”) and the Organization itself.

#### **Chapter II. Goals and Principles**

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<sup>1</sup> URL: [https://en.odkb-csto.org/documents/documents/ustav\\_organizatsii\\_dogovora\\_o\\_kollektivnoy\\_bezopasnosti\\_/#loaded](https://en.odkb-csto.org/documents/documents/ustav_organizatsii_dogovora_o_kollektivnoy_bezopasnosti_/#loaded)

### **Article 3**

The goals of the Organization shall be strengthening of peace, international and regional security and stability, protection of independence on a collective basis, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Member States, in achievement of which the Member States prefer political means.

### **Article 4**

The Organization shall co-operate in its activity with the states which are not the members of the Organization, keep in touch with the international intergovernmental organizations operating in the sphere of security. The Organization shall promote formation of the fair, democratic world order based on conventional principles of international law.

### **Article 5**

The Organization shall operate on the basis of strict respect of independence, voluntariness of participation, equal rights and duties of the Member States, non-interference into the affairs falling within the national jurisdiction of the Member States.

### **Article 6**

This Charter shall not affect the rights and obligations of the Member States under other international treaties they are parties to.

### **Chapter III. Lines of Activity**

#### **Article 7**

The Member States shall take joint measures to achieve the purposes of the Organization to form thereunder the efficient system of collective security providing collective protection in case of menace to safety, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty and exercise of the right to collective defence, including creation of coalition (collective) forces of the Organization, regional (united) groups of armies (forces), peacekeeping forces, united systems and the bodies governing them, military infrastructure. The Member States shall also interact in the spheres of military and technical (military and economic) cooperation, supplying of armed forces, law enforcement agencies and special services with necessary arms, military, special equipment and special means, as well as in the spheres of training of military cadres and experts for the national armed forces, special services and law enforcement agencies.

*(the paragraph is as amended by the Protocol on amendments to the Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization of October 07, 2002, signed on December 10, 2010).*

The Member States shall adopt a resolution on placement in their territories of groups of armies (forces), objects of military infrastructure of the states which are not members of the Organization after carrying out of urgent consultations (coordination) with other Member States.

#### **Article 8**

The Member States shall co-ordinate and unite their efforts at struggle with international terrorism and extremism, illicit trafficking of drugs and psychotropic substances, weapon, organized transnational crime, illegal migration and other menaces to safety of the Member States.

The Member States shall take measures to creation and getting function within the framework of the Organization of the system of response to crisis situations menacing to safety, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Member States.

The Member States shall co-operate in the spheres of protection of state frontiers, exchange of information, information security, protection of the population and territories from emergency situations of natural and technogenic character, as well as from the dangers arising when maintaining or owing to the hostilities.

The Member States shall carry out their activity in these directions, including in close cooperation with all the interested states and international organizations with UN dominating.

*(the article is as amended by the Protocol on amendments to the Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization of October 07, 2002, signed on December 10, 2010).*

#### **Article 9**

The Member States shall approve and co-ordinate their foreign policy positions on the international and regional security problems, using, in particular, consulting mechanisms and procedures of the Organization.

#### **Article 10**

The Member States shall take measures for development of the conventional and legal base regulating functioning of the collective security system, and for harmonization of the national legislation concerning defence, military construction and safety.

#### **Chapter IV. Bodies of the Organization**

#### **Article 11**

The bodies of the Organization shall be:

- a) Council for Collective Security (the “Council”);
- b) Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (“CMFA”);
- b) Council of Ministers of Defence (“CMD”);
- c) Committee of Secretaries of Security Councils (“CSSC”);
- d) Permanent Council.

Permanent working bodies of the Organization shall be the Organization Secretariat (the “Secretariat”) and the Joint Staff of the Organization (the “Joint Staff”).

The Body of inter-parliamentary cooperation shall be the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization.

Functions and operating procedures of the bodies specified above shall be regulated by this Charter, as well as other regulatory legal acts of the Organization.

*(the article is as amended by the Protocol on amendments to the Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization of October 07, 2002, signed on December 10, 2010).*

#### **Article 12**

Resolutions of the Council, CMFA, CMD and CSSC on the issues, except for the procedural ones, shall be adopted by consensus.

When voting, any Member State shall have one vote. The voting procedure including on the procedural issues shall be regulated by the Rules of the Procedure of the Organization Bodies approved by the Council.

Resolutions of the Council and the resolutions of CMFA, CMD and CSSC adopted for execution thereof shall be binding for the Member States and shall be executed in accordance with the procedure established by the national laws.

The Council shall be entitled to adopt resolutions in a limited format provided that neither of the Member States objects to such a procedure of a resolution adoption. The resolution in a limited format may be adopted unless any of the Member States object to such a resolution.

The Member State which has not voted for the resolution adoption in a limited format shall not be liable for the consequences of the resolution adopted.

*(the article is as amended by the Protocol on amendments to the Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization of October 07, 2002, signed on December 10, 2010).*

### **Article 13**

Council shall be the supreme body of the Organization.

The Council shall consider the issues of principle of the Organization's activity and adopt the resolutions focused at implementation of its goals and tasks, as well as provide coordination and joint activity of the Member States for implementation of these goals.

The Council shall include the heads of the Member States.

Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Ministers of Defence, secretaries of security councils of the Member States, the Secretary General of the Organization, Permanent Representatives and Plenipotentiaries of the Member States under the Organization (the "permanent representatives") and the invited persons may take part in the meetings of the Council.

The Council shall be entitled to create working and subsidiary bodies of the Organization on a constant or temporary basis.

The Chairperson of the Board (the "Chairperson") shall be the head of State in the territory of which the regular session of the Council is held unless otherwise is decided by the Council. Its rights and duties shall be reserved thereby for the period until the next regular session of the Council.

If the Chairperson cannot carry out his/her functions, for the remained period the new Chairman shall be elected.

*(the article is as amended by the Protocol on amendments to the Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization of October 07, 2002, signed on December 10, 2010).*

### **Article 14**

CMFA shall be the advisory and executive body of the Organization for the issues of coordination of the Member States interaction in the field of foreign policy.



## **Article 15**

CMD shall be the advisory and executive body of the Organization for the issues of coordination of the Member States interaction in the field of military policy, military construction and military and technical cooperation.

## **Article 16**

CSSC shall be the advisory and executive body of the Organization for the issues of coordination of the Member States interaction in the field ensuring of their national security.

## **Article 16<sup>1</sup>**

Permanent Council shall be the coordinating body of the Organization dealing with cooperation within the framework of the Organization during the period between the sessions of the Council and providing implementation of the resolutions adopted by the Council, CMFA, CMD and CSSC together with permanent working bodies of the Organization.

The Permanent Council shall consist of the permanent representatives appointed by the heads of the Member States according to their interstate procedures and function in accordance with the Provision approved by the Council.

## **Chapter V. Secretary General.**

Permanent Working Bodies of the Organization

*(the Chapter is as amended by the Protocol on amendments to the Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization of October 07, 2002, signed on December 10, 2010)*

## **Article 17**

The Secretary General of the Organization (the "Secretary General") shall be the supreme administrative official of the Organization. The Secretary General shall manage the Secretariat, as well as perform coordination of activity of permanent working bodies of the Organization.

The Secretary General shall be appointed by the Council resolution for a period of three years (as advised by CMFA) of the citizens of the Member States.

The Secretary General shall be accountable to the Council, participate in the meetings of the Council, CMFA, CMD and CSSC and the Permanent Council.

The Secretary General shall coordinate development and approval of the draft documents submitted for consideration of the Organization bodies, represent the Organization before other states which are not the members thereof, international organizations, mass media and shall carry out working contacts with them.

The Secretary General shall be depositary in respect of this Charter, other international treaties concluded within the framework of the Organization and the accepted documents.

## **Article 18**

Secretariat shall carry out organizational, information, analytical and consultative support of activity of the Organization bodies.

Secretariat with Permanent Council shall prepare draft resolutions and other documents of the Organization bodies.

Secretariat shall be formed of the number of citizens of the Member States on a quota basis (officials) in proportion to contributions of the Member States to the budget of the Organization and citizens of the Member States employed on a competitive basis under a contract (employees).

Functions, procedure for formation and work of the Secretariat shall be defined by the relevant Provision approved by the Council.

The location of the Secretariat shall be Moscow, the Russian Federation. Conditions of stay of the Secretariat in the territory of the Russian Federation shall be regulated on the basis of the relevant international treaty.

#### **Article 18<sup>1</sup>**

The Joint Staff shall carry out the organizational and information and analytical support of CMD activity, shall be responsible for preparation of proposals on the military component of the Organization, organization and coordination of the practical implementation of the Organization bodies' resolutions concerning military cooperation referred to its competence in interaction with bodies of military administration of the Member States.

The Joint Staff shall be formed of the military servants of the Member States on a quota basis in proportion to contributions of the Member States to the budget of the Organization and citizens of the Member States employed on a competitive basis under a contract.

Tasks, functions, structure, membership and organizational principles of the Joint Staff shall be defined by the relevant Provision approved by the Council.

The location of the Joint Staff shall be Moscow, the Russian Federation. Conditions of stay of the Joint Staff in the territory of the Russian Federation shall be regulated on the basis of the relevant international treaty.

### **Chapter VI. Membership**

#### **Article 19**

Any state sharing the goals and principles of the Organization and being ready to undertake the obligations containing in this Charter and other international treaties and resolutions effective within the framework of the Organization may become a member of the Organization.

Resolution on admittance to the Organization shall be adopted by the Council.

Any Member State shall be entitled to withdraw from the Organization. After settlement of its obligations within the framework of the Organization such a State shall send to the depositary of the Charter the formal notice on the withdrawal not later than in six months prior to the date of withdrawal.

The procedure for admittance to and withdrawal from the Organization shall be defined by the relevant Provision approved by the Council.

#### **Article 20**

In case of a Member State failure to fulfil the provisions of this Charter, resolutions of the Council and the resolutions of other bodies of the Organization adopted for execution of the former, the Council may suspend its participation in the activity of the Organization bodies.

In case of continuation of a Member State's failure to fulfil the specified obligations, the Council may adopt a resolution on exclusion thereof from the Organization.

Resolutions on the issues concerning such a Member State shall be accepted without counting its vote.

The procedure for suspension of participation of the Member State in the activity of the Organization bodies or its exclusion from the Organization shall be determined by the relevant Provision approved by the Council.

#### **Chapter VII. Observers**

##### **Article 21**

The status of the observer of the Organization may be provided to the state which is not the member of the Organization, as well as to the international organization according to the official written request addressed to the Secretary General. The resolution on provision, suspension or cancellation of the observer status shall be adopted by the Council.

Participation of the observers in the sessions and meetings of Organization bodies shall be regulated by the Rules of Procedure of the Organization bodies.

#### **Chapter VIII. Legal Capacity, Privileges and Immunities**

##### **Article 22**

The Organization shall use the legal capacity necessary for implementation of its goals and tasks in the territory of each Member State.

The organization may cooperate with the states which are not its members, keep in touch with the international intergovernmental organizations operating in the sphere of security, conclude international treaties with them focused at establishment and development of such cooperation.

The Organization shall exercise the rights of a legal entity.

##### **Article 23**

Privileges and immunities of the Organization shall be defined by the relevant international treaty.

#### **Chapter IX. Financing**

##### **Article 24**

The activity of permanent working bodies of the Organization shall be financed at the expense of the Organization budget funds. Extrabudgetary funds may be raised (except for the borrowed funds) to support the Organization activity, the procedure for formation and use of which shall be defined by the relevant Provision approved by the Council.

*(the paragraph is as amended by the Protocol on amendments to the Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization of October 07, 2002, signed on December 10, 2010).*

The budget of the Organization shall be formed at the expense of contributions of the Member States approved by Council.

The budget of the Organization shall not have deficit.

The draft budget of the Organization for each fiscal year shall be developed by the Secretariat as agreed with the Member States according to the Provision on the Procedure of Formation

and Performance of the Organization Budget. The budget of the Organization shall be approved by the Council.

Provision on the Procedure of Formation and Performance of the Organization Budget shall be approved by the Council.

Member States shall independently incur the expenses related to participation of their representatives and experts in the meetings, meetings of the Organization bodies and other events carried out within the framework of the Organization, as well as the expenses related to the activity of permanent representatives.

#### **Article 25**

In case of the Member States failure to fulfil the obligations on repayment of indebtedness to the Organization budget within two years, the Council shall adopt a resolution on retention of the right to propose the citizens of this state to the quota positions within the framework of the Organization, as well as on vote deprivation in the Organization bodies until full repayment of the indebtedness.

### **Chapter X. Final Provisions**

#### **Article 26**

This Charter shall be subject to ratification and become effective from the date of delivery of the last written notice of ratification to the depositary by the states which have signed them.

The depositary shall notify the states which have signed this Charter on receipt of each notice of ratification.

#### **Article 27**

This Charter may be amended as consented by all the Member States, the amendments shall be executed as separate Protocol.

The Protocol on amendments to the Charter shall make an integral part thereof and become effective in accordance with the procedure established by Article 26 hereof.

Reservations to the Charter shall not be allowed.

Any disputes concerning interpretation and application of provisions of this Charter shall be settled by consultations and negotiations between the interested Member States. In case of failure to achieve the consent, the dispute shall be brought to the Council for consideration.

#### **Article 28**

Official and working language of the Organization shall be Russian.

#### **Article 29**

This Charter shall be registered with the UN Secretariat according to provisions of article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

### Appendix 3

#### RESULTS OF VOTING OF THE CSTO MEMBER STATES IN THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON UKRAINIAN ISSUES IN 2014-2023

compiled from Voting Data // United Nations Digital Library. URL: [https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?ln=en&cc=Voting%20Data&p=&f=&rm=&sf=year&so=d&rg=50&c=Voting%20Data&c=&of=hb&fti=0&ftc\\_2=General%20Assembly&fti=0](https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?ln=en&cc=Voting%20Data&p=&f=&rm=&sf=year&so=d&rg=50&c=Voting%20Data&c=&of=hb&fti=0&ftc_2=General%20Assembly&fti=0)

Name of the UNGA resolution (date of adoption)	Armenia	Belarus	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	Russia	Tajikistan
Resolution A/77/L.65 Cooperation between the United Nations and the Council of Europe (26.04.2023)	Yes	No	Yes	Abstained	No	Abstained
Resolution A/RES/ES-11/6 Principles of the Charter of the United Nations underlying a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine (23.02.2023)	Abstained	No	Abstained	Abstained	No	Abstained
Resolution A/RES/77/229 Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine (15.12.2022)	Abstained	No	No	Abstained	No	Abstained
Resolution A/RES/ES-11/5 Furtherance of remedy and reparation for aggression against Ukraine (14.11.2022)	Abstained	No	Abstained	Abstained	No	Abstained

Resolution A/RES/ES-11/4 Territorial integrity of Ukraine : defending the principles of the Charter of the United Nations (12.10.2022)	Abstained	No	Abstained	Abstained	No	Abstained
Resolution A/RES/ES-11/3 Suspension of the rights of membership of the Russian Federation in the Human Rights Council (07.04.2022)	Non-Voting	No	No	No	No	No
Resolution A/RES/ES-11/2 Humanitarian consequences of the aggression against Ukraine (24.03.2022)	Abstained	No	Abstained	Abstained	No	Abstained
Resolution A/RES/ES-11/1 Aggression against Ukraine (02.03.2022)	Abstained	No	Abstained	Abstained	No	Abstained
Resolution A/RES/76/179 The Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine (16.12.2021)	No	No	No	No	No	Abstained
Resolution A/RES/76/70 Problem of the militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, as well as parts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov (09.12.2021)	No	No	Abstained	No	No	Non-Voting

Resolution A/RES/75/192 Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine (16.12.2020)	No	No	No	No	No	Abstained
Resolution A/RES/75/29 Problem of the militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, as well as parts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov (07.12.2020)	No	No	Abstained	No	No	Non-Voting
Resolution A/RES/74/168 Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine (18.12.2019)	No	No	No	No	No	Non-Voting
Resolution A/RES/74/17 Problem of the militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, as well as parts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov (09.12.2019)	No	No	Abstained	No	No	Non-Voting
Resolution A/RES/73/263 Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine (22.12.2018)	No	No	No	No	No	No

Resolution A/RES/73/194 Problem of the militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, as well as parts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov (17.12.2018)	No	No	Abstained	Abstained	No	Non-Voting
Resolution A/RES/72/190 Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine (19.12.2017)	No	No	No	No	No	No
Resolution A/RES/68/262 Territorial integrity of Ukraine (27.03.2014)	No	No	Abstained	Non-Voting	No	Non-Voting



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